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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Corporations Insuring Employees' Lives
I. INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' in 1959 reversed a tax court
holding that a life insurance contract taken out by a corporation to
insure an employee's life was a wagering contract because neither the
corporation nor the beneficiary possessed an insurable interest in the
employee's life and that the proceeds were thus not excludible as an
amount received "under a life insurance contract."2 In 1964 the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals 3 affirmed a federal district court's judgment
entered on a jury's verdict that a corporation, which was both owner
and the beneficiary of a life insurance policy, had no insurable interest
in the employee's life and consequently could not exclude under
section 101 (a) 4 the proceeds which it had received from the insurance
company. In both cases the insurance companies had paid the
proceeds without asserting a lack of insurable interest as a defense to
payment. These recent decisions emphasize that the pragmatic prob-
lem of whether a corporation has an insurable interest in its em-
ployees' lives is a tax-oriented dispute with the federal government,
not a private dispute with the insurance companies. The ambit of the
insurable interest concept in tax law is identical with that concept
in insurance law; the Commissioner argues that the statutory phrase
"insurance contract" obviously means a valid insurance contract
implying that the contract must meet the requirements of the state's
insurance law, specifically that an insurable interest must exist. To
attack the validity of this implication, one could argue three points.
First, Congress in using that phrase did not consider whether or not
the insurance contract must meet the requirements of state law and
thus was not indicating any such intent by its use; second, by analogy,
in using other words, such as "corporation," Congress did not intend
to impose requirements of state law and thus did not necessarily do
so in this situation; and third, the resulting rule imposes a different
1. Ducros v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1959), reversing 30 T.C. 1337
(1958). See generally 45 CORNELL L.Q. 818 (1960).
2. 30 T.C. 1337 (1958). This decision was actually based on the Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, § 22(b)(1), 53 Stat. 9, which stated: "Exclusion from Gross Income.-Thc
following items shall not be included in gross income and shall be exempt from
taxation under this chapter: (1) Life Insurance.-Amounts received-(A) under a
life insurance contract paid by reason of the death of the insured .. "
3. Atlantic Oil Co. v. Patterson, 64-1 CCH U.S. TAx CAsEs ff 9425 (5th Cir.
1964).
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101(a)(1), which states as a general rule that "gross
income does not include amounts received (whether in a single sum or otherwise)
under a life insurance contract, if such amounts are paid by reason of the death
of the insured." Compare this language with that used in the Int. Rev. Code of
1939, § 22(b) (1), 53 Stat. 9, quoted in note 2 supra.
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tax result in different states depending on their laws. In general, one
is faced with a situation in which the tax law tail wags the insurance
law dog. An examination of this problem area appears to raise two
central questions. What are the basic practical uses of life insurance
by a corporation? When does a corporation have an insurable interest
in its employees' lives? The examination of these questions is the
purpose of this note.
II. PRAI CAL USES OF LIFE INSURANCE BY A CORPORATION
A. Focus of Discussion
Assuming for the moment that a corporation can legally insure a
particular employee, we first focus the discussion on the areas in
which life insurance might be utilized as a practical tool to obtain
the business goals of the corporation. Besides the possibility of using
life insurance to fund specific plans,5 such as retirement plans, pension
plans, and business purchase agreements, 6 two general business uses
suggest themselves. The first is to protect the corporation against
the loss of managerial skill and experience resulting from the death of
specific employees; the second is to compensate certain employees
for their talent and labor without the federal income tax hardships.
7
This first suggested use appears obvious, for it indicates the traditional
use of life insurance, which is to spread the risk of loss. However, the
second suggested use is relatively recent and evolved through recog-
nition of the advantageous treatments, such as deductions and exclu-
sions, available under the federal income tax law, especially advan-
tageous since the current high income tax rates reach a maximum
marginal rate of 48 per cent for corporations 8 and a maximum marginal
rate of 70 per cent for individuals. 9
5. For an excellent technical discussion of this question and for examples of
specific plans, see Life-Insurance-Corporate Business Use, 34 BNA Tax Management
(1963); FoosANnm, TAXATiON OF LIFE INSURANCE AND) ANNurrIEs (1960). See also
CCH 1963 STAND. FED. TAX REP., Tax Rewards in Personal and Business Life In-
surance. See generally, New York Life Insurance Co., Business Purchase Agreements
Funded with Life Insurance (1956); Note, 9 VAND. L. REv. 373 (1956).
6. "Many reasons are advanced by employers for adopting such plans: the need
to provide for the future of employees in these days of high taxes and low interest
rates, the need to secure increased employee interest in production, the aid which plans
afford in attracting and keeping good men and the desirability of a more efficient solu-
tion of the problem of retiring superannuated employees." Note, 48 CoLJm. L. REv.
393 (1948).
7. A detailed examination of the tax advantages to the individual of saving through
life insurance is presented in Goode, Policyholders" Interest Income From Life Insurance
Under the Income Tax, 16 VAND. L. REv. 33 (1962). See generally CCH 1963
STAND. FED. TAX REP., Tax Rewards in Personal and Business Life Insurance.
8. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 11. For a taxable year beginning in 1963, the
maximum marginal rate is 52% (a 30% normal tax plus a 22% surtax). The following
year it is reduced to 50% (a 22% normal tax plus a 28% surtax), and in 1965 it will be
48% (a 22% normal tax plus a 26% surtax).
9. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 11. For a taxable year- beginning "on or after
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B. Federal Tax Provisions Concerning Life Insurance
To gain a proper perspective of the impact of the federal tax law
on business decisions concerning life insurance, a concise summary
of the tax structure is necessary.'0 Fundamental to the income tax
are section 6111 defining gross income as "all income from whatever
source derived" and section 16212 allowing "as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business."
In amplifying these fundamental sections, several sections specifi-
cally deal with life insurance. Concerning the payment of premiums,
section 26413 prohibits the deduction of premiums paid for insurance
on the life of an employee where the taxpayer is either directly or
indirectly a beneficiary of the policy. This section, also, prohibits the
deduction of interest paid on a debt which was incurred to carry a
single-premium life insurance contract as therein defined. 14 When a
cestui que vie15 dies, the proceeds received under a life insurance
policy are excluded from the gross income of the recipient, "if such
amounts are paid by reason of the death of the insured [i.e., the cestui
que vie],"'1 6 according to section 101. This exclusion does not apply,
however, where there was a transfer of the life insurance contract for
valuable consideration. 17 If the insured exercises an option under the
January 1, 1964 and before January 1, 1965, the maximum marginal rate is 77%,
which is on amounts over $200,000. This percentage is 70% for the following taxable
year beginning in 1965.
10. Of course, all textual references to "sections" refer to sections of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.
11. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a), which states, "except as otherwise pro-
vided in this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source derived,
including (but not limited to) the following items . . . (9) Annuities. (10) Income
from life insurance and endowment contracts .
12. Ixr. 1Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 162.
13. INT. 1 Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 264. Section 264(a) expressly provides that "no
deduction shall be allowed for-(1) Premiums paid on any life insurance policy cover-
ing the life of any officer or employee, or of any person financially interested in any
trade or business carried on by the tax-payer, when the taxpayer is directly or in-
directly a beneficiary under such policy. (2) Any amount paid or accrued on
indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry a single premium life insurance,
endowment, or annuity contract."
14. INT. REv. CODE Or 1954, § 264(b).
15. As most readers already know, the cestui que vie, sometimes abbreviated
"CQV," is the person whose death is a condition of the insurance company's promise
to pay the face amount of the policy. This term is used to avoid the ambiguity of
using "insured" to designate both the person making the contract with the insurer and
the person whose death is a condition of payment.
16. IwT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 101(a)(1).
17. INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101(a)(2), which states, "in the case of a transfer
for a valuable consideration, by assignment or otherwise, of a life insurance contract
or any interest therein, the amount excluded from gross income by paragraph (1)
shall not exceed an amount equal to the sum of the actual value of such consideration
and the premiums and other amounts subsequently paid by the transferee." Two
alternative exceptions to this inclusion are then stated.
policy by which the company holds the face amount under an agree-
ment to pay interest thereon, this interest is expressly included in gross
income,'8 Or, if the insured exercises an annuity option under the
insurance contract, the interest element which is included in any
payment is likewise included in gross income, with an express excep-
tion for annual receipts by the surviving spouse up to 1,000 dollars.19
Furthermore, if an ordinary life insurance contract is exchanged
for another such contract, for an annuity contract, or for an endow-
ment contract,20 section 1035 prohibits the "recognition" of any gain
or loss realized on the exchange.2 ' Similarly, an endowment contract
may be exchanged either for another endowment contract or for an
annuity contractm2 and annuity contracts may be exchanged for each
other2 without the recognition of any loss or gain on the exchange.
The last section expressly concerning life insurance is section 72
which provides for taxing the annuity payments under the general
annuity rules of that section where the insurance contract includes
an annuity which begins during the life of the cestui que vie.2 Where
a life insurance policy is surrendered before maturity or where the
insurance proceeds are payable in one lump sum, section 72(e)
includes any gain in gross income, except that portion qualifying
under section 72(e) (3).2-
The pertinent federal estate tax provision on insurance, section 2042,
includes in the gross estate life insurance proceeds receivable by the
executor or life insurance over which the decedent possessed at his
death any of the incidents of ownership. As a fringe benefit, there-
fore, a corporation may own life insurance on an employee's life and
name his wife or his children as beneficiary of the policy. Thus, the
employee's death would cause his family to receive money not
burdened by estate tax liability.
C. Specific Uses
1. Corporate Protection Against Loss-(a) Basic Policy Decisions.-
What corporate purpose could be considered more essential than key
man insurance? The business that insures its buildings and machinery and
automobiles from every possible hazard can hardly be expected to exercise
less care in protecting itself against the loss of two of its most vital assets-
18. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101(c). "Interest.-If any amount excluded from
gross income by subsection (a) or (b) [of section 101] is held under an agreement
to pay interest thereon, the interest payments shall be included in gross income."
19. INT. REv. CODE or 1954, § 101(d).
20. INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 1035(b), defines "endowment contract," "annuity
contract," and 'life insurance contract" for purposes of § 1035.
21. INT. REv. CODE Or 1954, § 1035(a) (1).
22. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1035(a) (2).
23. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1035(a)(3).
24. INT. REv. CODE or 1954, § 72.
25. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 72(e).
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managerial skill and experience. In fact, the government has not seriously
contended here that key man insurance is not a corporate purpose.26
Thus, it is fairly certain that the death of a key man is the loss of an
asset to the corporation.27 General business knowledge about the
corporation, personal contacts in the marketing community, special
technical skill which helps the corporation meet competition, and
organizational concepts of efficiency are but a few of the essential
characteristics which key men bring to the corporation with their
employment and which they take from the corporation with their
death or departure. Specifically, the scientific knowledge and in-
genuity of a research engineer, the customer's confidence in a leading
salesman, and the managerial skills and employees' respect for a
personnel officer all contribute to the corporation's progress in making
money. In addition to the immediate loss of these intangible assets,
the corporation usually incurs expenses in finding and hiring a satis-
factory replacement and always loses other employees' time in training
the novice and teaching him the specific responsibilities of his new
position.
Assuming that the corporate policy makers decide that the corpo-
ration should protect itself against this potential loss with life insur-
ance, the next question is what type of insurance policy should be
procured. Various insurance companies offering numerous policies
present a myriad of choices, but basically the choice is among term
insurance, ordinary life insurance, paid-up insurance, and endowment
policies. iProfessionals in the insurance field possess a great under-
standing of each of these basic types, and consequently are in a
superior position to advise businesses on the proper selection.
Generally, term insurance, sometimes called "pure insurance," is
becoming recognized as the best insurance vehicle with which to
attain corporate protection against the loss of key men for several
reasons. Term life insurance gives the best protection against loss
for the cheapest cost. Although other policies such as ordinary life
insurance may offer combined advantages of investment and of acces-
sible collateral for possible loans, some corporate policy makers weigh
other factors when selecting the type of policy. For instance, because
all business corporations are concerned with making money, one cri-
terion with which to judge a corporation's success at profit making is
to compute its annual earnings as a percentage of its invested capital.
26. Emeloid v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 230, 233 (3d Cir. 1959), revcrshng 14
T.C. 1295 (1950). On a question arising under the excess profit tax, the taxpayer
persuaded the court that the money which the corporation borrowed to purchase
single-premium life policies insuring the lives of its two principal officers and stock-
holders did constitute "borrowed invested capitar' as that term was used in the excess
profit law.
27. See generally notes 118 to 133 infra and accompanying text.
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Increased expenses decrease earnings unless those expenses generate
additional income greater than the expenses. Applying these axio-
matic principles of business to the purchase of life insurance generally
indicates that ordinary life insurance, endowment policies, etc., would
not be a wise investment unless its return was greater than the return
on capital invested in the corporation. Because of the limited security
investments of life insurance companies and the regulations imposed
by states upon life insurance companies, it is a rare example where
the investment return on a life insurance policy exceeds the profit
ratio on invested capital in a successful corporation. Second, con-
cerning the loan collateral argument, not expending the extra amount
for these other policies would increase profits which if accumulated
would reduce the need for loans. Third, what happens to the cash
surrender value of an ordinary life insurance policy when the key
man dies? Under various theories, either it is returned to the corpo-
ration with the insurance proceeds (an amount equal to the face
amount of the policy less cash surrender value) or it is forfeited to
the insurance company which returns the insurance proceeds (an
amount equal to the full face amount of the policy). Regardless of
the theory, the practical result is that the insured corporation only
receives the face amount of the policy. These three aspects of
ordinary life insurance as contrasted to term life insurance indeed
should be weighed when selecting the type of life insurance with
which to protect the corporation against the loss of a key man.
(b) Tax Aspects Before Death of the Key Man.-Although insur-
ance policies are carried to protect the corporation against a true loss
and section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code allows deductions for
ordinary and necessary business expenses, the corporation is not
permitted to deduct premium payments on its key man insurance
policy when it designates itself as the beneficiary under section 264.28
Thus, the premiums are paid by the corporation in after-tax dollars,
an additional factor emphasizing the necessity of protection at the
cheapest cost. Regardless of the use to which the policy is put, even
a use which would give rise otherwise to deductible business expenses,
the corporation cannot deduct the premiums.29 For example, where
the insurance policies are assigned to a creditor as collateral and
where the continued payment of the premiums is necessary to main-
tain the loan, the deduction of the premiums is disallowed.30 This
28. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 264(a) (1), prohibits the deduction because the
corporation would be "directly ... a beneficiary under the policy." See, e.g., Raymond
L. Klinck, 11 CCH TAx CT. MEM. DEC. 19,378 (1952).
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.264-1(a) (1960).




non-deductability of premiums also is applicable where the corpora-
tion pays the premiums, but is only "indirectly a beneficiary under
the policy."3' For example, a corporation could not deduct the
premiums which it paid on a policy insuring the life of an officer
and stockholder where the stockholders,32 in proportion to their per-
centage ownership of the corporation, were the beneficiaries. 33 But
since a corporation would be neither directly nor indirectly a benefi-
ciary under the policy, however, it could deduct premiums which it
paid to insure the life of its debtor or which it paid on policies
assigned to it as security if this were necessary to maintain the
security.35
To prepay the premiums on its key man life insurance policies,
assuming the corporation has sufficient cash to do so, results in a
small tax savings. The insurance company will discount those pre-
miums which are prepaid, and the discount income or savings effected
is not includible in the corporation's gross income. But if the corpora-
tion borrows money to pay "a substantial number of future premiums
on the contract,"3 6 it will lose the interest deduction usually allowed
under section 163. 37 Of course, interest paid on loans secured by the
cash value of ordinary life insurance policies generally remains
deductible.38
If the corporation owns key man insurance policies and designates
the stockholders as beneficiaries, 39 the premiums paid to the insurance
company may be construed as dividends under 316,40 and the Coin-
31. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 264(a).
32. The cestui que vie's wife was the named beneficiary in proportion to his
ownership in the corporation.
33. 3 Cum. BULL. 543 (1920). Anyway, these premium payments by the cor-
poration seem to be dividends to the stockholders and as such non-deductible.
34. 1 Cum. BULL. 104 (1919).
35. Commissioner v. Charleston Nat'l Bank, 213 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1954); Dominion
Nat'l Bank, 26 B.T.A. 421 (1932), in which the Commissioner acquiesced in XI-2
Cum. BuLL. 3 (1932).
36. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 264(b)(2).
37. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 264(a)(2).
38. See, e.g., Keith v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1944).
39. See, e.g., 3 Cum. BuLL. 543 (1920), which states: "Where a corporation in-
sures the life of its president, the stockholders being beneficiaries in proportion to
their stock holdings and the wife of the president (not herself a stockholder) being
a beneficiary in proportion to her husband's stock holdings, no deduction for the
payment of premiums can be allowed . .. since the corporation itself is indirectly
a beneficiary under the policy. The premiums paid on such a policy are a charge
against surplus and represent dividends to the stockholders. . . .This applies as well
to the officer upon whose life the insurance is carried."
40. Ducros v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1959), expressly left this ques-
tion open.
"We have not considered the right of the Government to tax the premiums paid
as a dividend to the beneficiaries or to follow the cash surrender value of the in-
surance into the bands of the beneficiaries as these questions were not presented
either to the Tax Court or here." Id. at 52.
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missioner probably would argue this point. To rebut the Commis-
sioner's argument, a stockholder might argue, among other points, (1)
that the corporation's right of ownership allows it to change the
beneficiary and thus he has received no benefit, (2) that selling his
stock before the cestui que vie dies would deprive him of the proceeds
and of any benefit, or (3) that he has no insurable interest in an
officer of the corporation and consequently could not insure himself
against loss, a point which the law of the individual states deter-
mines a.4  A possible fallacy in the first two arguments is that they
presuppose that "benefit" only arises when the cestui que vie dies, a
narrow interpretation of "benefit" which disregards the possession of
the contingent opportunity to receive the proceeds. By analogy, is
it persuasive to say that an insured received no "benefit" under his
fire insurance policy because his building did not bum and no
"benefit" under his liability insurance policy because a law suit was
not filed against him?
A corporation that elects to file its return under subchapter S42 is
not concerned with the constructive dividend argument. Because the
earnings computed without deducting the premiums paid on key man
life insurance under section 264, are taxed directly to the stockholders
as individual income,43 in effect the premiums paid are taxed to the
stockholders. Another tax consequence is that the bases of the
shareholders' stock increase proportionally to the premiums thus
paid.44 Furthermore, if the key man life insurance policy has a cash
surrender value, the corporate earnings and profits are increased
when the premium actually paid is less than the annual increase in
the cash surrender value.45 This last proposition applies to the corpo-
ration whether or not it qualifies to be taxed under subchapter S.
If the corporation purchases its life insurance policies with a mutual
insurance company or purchases participating policies from a stock
insurance company, the "dividends" it receives are treated as a
partial refund of the premiums and, as such, are excluded from gross
income.46 Of course, any excess of the "dividends" over the premiums
paid is conversely included in gross income. 47 Following the general
rule that interest is received when credited if the credit is immedi-
ately subject to withdrawal,48 interest on accumulated life insurance
41. See generally, Note, 49 GEo. L.J. 594 (1961).
42. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 1371-77.
43. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1376.
44. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101(a)(1).
45. See generally, Albrecht, "Dividends" and "Earning or Profits," 7 TAx L. REv.
157 (1952).
46. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 72(e)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.72-1(a), -1(b) (1960).
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-11(b) (1960).
48. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1960).
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dividends, which is neither restricted nor limited on the time or man-
ner of payment, is taxable in the year credited.
49
Finally, consider the tax aspects of surrendering or of selling the
life insurance policy with a cash value before the cestui que vie dies.
Either surrendering the policy for its cash value or selling the policy
for valuable consideration gives rise to ordinary income when a gain
is realized, and this gain is computed by subtracting from the amount
of premiums paid any portion attributable to other benefits, e.g.,
disability income and double indemnity.5 That this gain actually
represents accrued and unpaid interest is the theory supporting its
taxation as ordinary income.51 Any interest 52 paid on money which
was borrowed to pay the premiums increases the cost basis of the
policy;53 likewise, the discounted cost (the amount actually paid) is
used where the premiums were prepaid. If a loss results from the
sale or surrender of an insurance policy, the loss is not "recognized"
on the theory that it merely was the cost of protection while the
policy was effective.
55
Selling a policy to the employee who is the cestui que vie is a special
situation. In such a case, if the consideration is less than the fair
market value, the employee is taxed as compensation to him on the
difference between the fair market value and the consideration ac-
tually paid.56 To evaluate "fair market value," the Treasury Depart-
ment uses the "replacement value" of the policy which is either the
interpolated terminal reserve plus any prepaid premiums (where
additional premiums are due) or the cost of a single premium policy
49. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 72(e)(1) (B).
50. Rev. Rul. 55-349, 1955-1 Cum. BuLL. 232, which states: "For the purpose
of computing the aggregate premiums or consideration paid for an endowment con-
tract under the provisions of section 22(b) (2) (A) of the 1939 Code any portion of the
total premium paid which is attributable to other benefits, such as a disability income
benefit, is not to be included as a part of the total premium paid for the endowment
contract."
51. Estate of Crocker, 37 T.C. 605 (1962). "Although a part of the total in-
crement received by the petitioner here may have been due to 'dividends' rather than
to a specified percentage of interest earned on the reserve attributable to his policy,
it is clear that the greatest portion must have been due to the latter. . . . We ac-
cordingly conclude . . . that the amount received above the cost of the policy is
ordinary income in its entirety and not capital gain, and that this excess is to be
computed by subtracting, from the amount received, petitioner's cost as stipulated by
the parties." Id. at 613. See also Roff v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1962),
affirming 36 T.C. 818 (1961) (sale of annuity contracts).
52. As stated above, this interest is non-deductible under the INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 264(a)(1), (b).
53. Chapin v. McGowan, 271 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1959).
54. I.T. 3513, 1941-2 Cum. BULL. 75.
55. See, e.g., London Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1935).
56. Rev. Rul. 59-195, 1959-1 Cum. BuLL. 18.
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at the cestui que vie's current age (where the insurance policy is
paid-up. )57
(c) Tax Aspects After Death of the Key Man.-Section 101 ex-
cludes from gross income the amounts received "under a life insurance
,contract, if such amounts are paid by reason of the death of the
insured."58 Thus, the corporate beneficiary owning key-man insurance
policies receives the life insurance proceeds tax free as an exclusion.
Most of the current litigation59 concerning this issue involves an
interpretation of the phrase "under a life insurance contract" con-
tained in section 101.60 The Commissioner argues that this phrase
implies an inherent requirement of insurable interest, which is a
requisite to a valid life insurance contract. This legal limit will be
analyzed later,61 however, and further comment at this point is in-
appropriate. Yet, the reader should note the importance of this
common law rule to the tax problem.
Transferring any life insurance policy, including key-man policies,
for valuable consideration may require the transferee to include in
his gross income part of the proceeds which he received. To measure
the amount of this inclusion (if any), one must subtract the sum of
the consideration paid for the policy and any additional premiums
paid by the transferee to keep it in force, from the proceeds.62 Taxa-
tion will not occur and the exclusion remains applicable, however,
when the transferee's basis in the policy is determined by referring
to the transferor's basis or when the transferee is either the cestui
que vie or a corporation in which the cestui que vie is a stockholder
or an officer. 63 To launch a corporate program of obtaining key-man
insurance policies, the corporation's officers could sell their existent
life insurance policies to their corporation without the corporation
losing the exclusion when it receives the proceeds upon their death.
An additional practical consequence of the exception which retains
57. Treas. Regs. § 25.2512-5 (1958).
58. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101(a)(1).
59. See, e.g., Ducros v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1959), reversing 30
T.C. 1337 (1958).
60. See footnotes 118 to 133 infra and accompanying text.
61. INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, § 101(a)(2).
62. "In the case of a transfer for a valuable consideration, by assignment or other-
wise, of a life insurance contract or any interest therein, the amount excluded from
gross income by paragraph (1) shall not exceed an amount equal to the sum of the
actual value of such consideration and the premiums and other amounts subsequently
paid by the transferee." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101(a) (2).
63. "The preceding sentence [note 62 supra] shall not apply in the case of such
a transfer-(A) if such contract or interest therein has a basis for determining gain
or loss in the hands of a transferee determined in whole or in part by reference to
such basis of such contract or interest therein in the hands of the transferor, or (B)
if such transfer is to the insured, to a partner of the insured, to a partnership in
which the insured is a partner, or to a corporation in which the insured is a share-
holder or officer." INT. RE V. CODE OF 1954, § 101(a) (2).
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exclusion is that tax-free corporate reorganizations do not destroy
the exclusion of the proceeds from gross income.4
A corporation electing to file its tax returns under subchapter S
also receives the benefit of the exclusion in section 101. Furthermore,
none of the proceeds received by the electing corporation from its
key-men life insurance policies is taxable to its stockholders in the year
when the proceeds were received. In this respect the corporation's
earnings and profits, which includes the amount by which the
proceeds exceed the cash surrender value of the policy, can exceed the
taxable income of the corporation. 65 However, this statement that
corporate earnings and profits can exceed the taxable income of the
corporation is a general one and is not limited to subchapter S corpo-
rations. Whenever the proceeds received by a corporation exceed
the cash surrender value of the policy 66 this generalization is true.
Although the corporation may exclude the life insurance proceeds
from its gross income, distributing the proceeds to the stockholders
is a dividend and, consequently, taxable. 67 If the corporation is the
beneficial owner of the life insurance policies (e.g., if a trustee or an
agent receives the proceeds for the corporation) the distribution to
the stockholders will be taxed as a dividend.68 If stockholders rather
than the corporation are named as beneficiaries under the policy, the
proceeds which they receive from the insurance company may be
construed as a "dividend" from the corporation.69 Although one court
64. For example, "the X Corporation purchases for a single premium of $500 an
insurance policy in the face amount of $1,000 upon the life of A, one of its em-
ployees, naming the X Corporation as beneficiary. The X Corporation transfers the
policy to the Y Corporation in a tax-free reorganization (the policy having a basis
for determining gain or loss in the hands of the Y Corporation determined by
reference to its basis in the hands of the X Corporation). The Y Corporation re-
ceives the proceeds of $1,000 upon the death of A. The entire $1,000 is to be
excluded from the gross income of the Y Corporation." Treas. Reg. § 1.101-1(b)(5),
example (2) (1960).
65. Treas. Reg. § 1.1377-2(b) (1960), which states: "Except as otherwise provided
in section 1377, the earnings and profits of the taxable year of an electing small
business corporation are computed in the same manner as the earnings and profits
of corporations generally. Therefore, such earnings and profits can exceed the taxable
income of the corporation, as in the case of a corporation which uses percentage
depletion in computing its taxable income or which receives tax-exempt interest on
certain governmental obligations."
66. If a corporation received life insurance proceeds of $10,000 from a policy with
a cash surrender value of $6,000, the simple bookkeeping entry would be:
debit "cash" $10,000
credit "cash value of life insurance" $ 6,000
credit "surplus" $ 4,000
67. See, e.g., Cummings v. Commissioner, 73 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1935).
68. Golden v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1940).
69. Contrast Treas. Reg. § 1.264-1(b) (1960), which states: "Whether or not the
taxpayer [i.e., the one who pays the premiums] is a beneficiary under the policy, the
proceeds of the policy paid by reason of the death of the insured [i.e., the cestui que




has rejected this contention," the Commissioner expressly refuses to
follow that decision, 71 which forewarns of additional litigation on the
issue. Considering the existing doubt, it appears likely that the Com-
missioner will achieve at least a partial inclusion of the proceeds in
the beneficiaries' gross income as a constructive dividend from the
corporation.7
2
2. Compensation to Employees Using Group Term Life Insurance.-
Fringe benefits in the form of shorter working hours, longer paid
vacations, pension plans, profit sharing plans, stock option plans,
health insurance, and life insurance have become common place in
our industrial society.73 These, not mere salary increases, are often
the goals of employees. The advantages of these fringe benefits being
furnished by the corporate employer rather than by the individual
employee are twofold: (1) bulk purchases by the corporation (e.g.,
of health and group life insurance policies) yield a lower per unit
cost than available to the employee individually, and (2) the federal
government pays for part of the cost in allowing deductions because
the employer pays for the benefit with pre-tax dollars while an
individual generally would have to pay for the benefit with post-tax
dollars.74 Consequently, a corporation can give benefits with a
70. Ducros v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1959). In this case the
Commissioner argued that the proceeds of the insurance policy on the life of the
corporation's president received by the beneficiary stockholders were taxable as
dividends to the stockholders. To buttress this contention, the Commissioner em-
phasized that the insurance policy was an asset on the corporation's balance sheet, that
the corporation paid the premiums, and that the corporation possessed the right to
change the beneficiary. Rejecting the Commissioner's argument, the court stated that
these factors relate to the policy itself and not to the proceeds of the policy.
71. Rev. Rul. 61-134, 1961-29 INT. REv. BULL. 20.
72. However, the court deciding Ducros expressly refused to decide either whether
the premiums paid by the corporation were dividends to the stockholders who were
the beneficiaries or whether the cash surrender value of the policy may be traced from
the corporation to the stockholders as a dividend. Ducros v. Commissioner, supra
note 70, at 52.
73. The growing importance of these benefits has often been discussed. E.g., "The
familiar picture of transferring one's accumulated wealth through the use of traditional
inter vivos and testamentary devices has been changed: one chooses employment
under which a present share of earned income is replaced by a claim to future con-
sumption. Retirement, disability, or untimely death must be anticipated, and provided
for." Lynn, Foreman, & Wehr, The New Inheritance: Employee Benefit Plans as a
Wealth Devolution Device, 11 SrAN. L. REV. 242, 244 (1959). The authors supported
this statement with the following quotation: "Major fringe benefits by U.S. industry
will top $12 billion this year (1957), equal to 6% of total wage payments by private
business. In 1956 alone, says Commerce Department, industry paid $5.71 billion for
welfare and pension funds, $3.19 billion for old-age and survivors' insurance, another
$1.85 billion for unemployment insurance, and $983 million for accident compensa-
tion." Time, Sept. 9, 1957, p. 99.
74. For example, if a corporation gives an employee a benefit costing ten dollars
($10.00), the corporation receives a deduction and the benefit usually is excluded
from the employee's gross income. On the other hand, if the corporation gives an
employee ten dollars ($10.00) as compensation, the corporation still receives a
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maximum value to the employee at minimum cost to the employer.
Although various types of fringe benefits involve life insurance,
the most frequent and advantageous benefit is the furnishing of group
term life insurance to some or all employees. First, group term life
insurance can be discriminatory in favor of officers, stockholders,
supervisors, and highly compensated employees. Without approba-
tion by the Internal Revenue Service and in contrast to qualified
pension and profit sharing plans, a corporation can execute this type
of fringe benefit and receive favorable tax treatment (which will be
discussed below), provided the corporation can find an insurance
company to write the policy.
Second, an insured employee who participates in the plan need
not pass a physical examination. In fact, although one is an un-
insurable risk under individual policies, he can receive insurance
under the group term life insurance policy as long as he does not
sever his employment with the corporation.
Third, the younger employees' premiums subsidize the older em-
ployees' premiums, because the average age of the employees insured
under the policy usually determines the premium cost which the
corporation pays. While a younger employee may consider this as a
distinct disadvantage, he still can anticipate the time when his in-
surance will be subsidized by the other young employees. Moreover,
when the corporation pays the premium, the younger employee
probably is apathetic to this feature of group term life insurance, a
feature which is mentioned as neither an advantage nor a disadvan-
tage.
Fourth, group term life insurance is inexpensive. Truly, it is pure
insurance. It possesses no so-called investment or savings element,
it possesses no cash surrender value, and consequently the corporation
receives exactly what it buys-protection against death for its em-
ployees.
Fifth, variations and options are possible with group term life
insurance. For example, the plan might permit the individual em-
ployee to obtain additional term insurance by a small deduction from
his pay check. Or the group policy might give the individual em-
ployee the right to convert his insurance into ordinary life at his
option. These are but a few examples. Many more are possible.
These five features of group term life insurance consider only the
business purpose or non-tax aspect of this benefit. More important
perhaps is the tax aspect, namely, the three advantages which the
current law gives. These advantages are: (1) that the corporation
deduction but this amount is included in the employee's gross income. After paying
his income tax (assume 20%), the employee only has eight dollars ($8.00) with which
to buy the particular benefit.
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can deduct the premiums it pays, (2) that, to a limited extent, the
premiums are excluded from the employees' income, and (3) that
the proceeds received by the employees' beneficiaries are excluded
from the recipients' gross income.
First, the corporation's deduction of the premiums is governed by
the same basic rules on deductibility of life insurance premiums paid
by the employer corporation which were discussed above, and which
will not be reiterated. In summary, however, if the corporation is
neither directly nor indirectly a beneficiary under the policy,75 if the
premiums are paid to the insurance company as additional compen-
sation to the employee,7 6 and if the total compensation to the in-
dividual employee is reasonable,77 the corporation may deduct the
premiums paid.
Second, the Revenue Act of 1964, among other things, added a
new section to the Internal Revenue Code which generally includes
in the employee's gross income the cost of group term life insurance
only to the extent that such cost exceeds the sum of the cost of
50,000 dollars of such insurance and the employee's contribution
toward purchasing the policy.7s To help enforce this inclusion, the
employer who provides such group term life insurance is required to
file an informational return.79 According to previous Treasury Regula-
tions, "premiums paid by an employer on policies of group term life
insurance covering the lives of his employees are not gross income
to the employees, even if they designate the beneficiaries." 0 To
curtail undue utilization of this fringe benefit before Congress changed
the law, the Treasury Department had somewhat restricted this tax
feature through its revenue rulings.81 Yet, thinking that a loophole
still existed, the late President Kennedy recommended that Congress
limit this exclusion to the cost of 5,000 dollars group term insurance. 82
75. INT. RBv. CODE OF 1954, § 264(a)(1).
76. See, e.g., Semon Bache & Co. v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1931);
C. F. Smith Co., 13 CCH TAx CT. MEm. DEC. f[ 20,442 (1954).
77. See, e.g., Hubert Transfer & Storage Co., 7 CCH TAx CT. MEM. DEC. ff 16,321
(1948).
78. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 79 (as amended by the Revenue Act of 1964).
79. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6052 (as amended by the Revenue Act of 1964).
80. Treas. Reg. § 1.161-2(d)(2) (1960).
81. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 55-357, 1955-1 Cur. BULL. 13 (the portion of the premium
paid by withholding from the employee's pay check is to be included in his gross
income); Rev. Rul. 54-165, 1954-1 CuM. BULL. 17 (Treas. Reg. § 1.62-2(d)(2), ap-
plies although the group term insurance is convertible into ordinary life insurance);
Mim. 6477, 1950-1 CuM. BuLL. 16 (where a policy combines term and ordinary
insurance, only that portion allocable to the term insurance is excludible).
82. President Kennedy's tax message to Congress on January 24, 1963, P-H FED.
TAX REP. BULL., ff 27,512.22 (Jan. 25, 1963): "Neither the current value of group
term life insurance protection nor the benefits received thereunder are now subject
to tax if purchased for an employee by his employer. This is, in effect, a valuable
form of compensation, meeting the widespread desire to provide protection for one's
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Congress followed his suggestion but, as first stated, raised the amount
to 50,000 dollars. The prerequisite to this exclusion-that one must
be an "employee"-still remains, however. While this requirement
denies the exclusion to partners and to proprietors, it grants the
exclusion to employees, who may or may not be stockholders, of
subchapter S corporations.
Third, receipt of the proceeds is governed by section 101, as dis-
cussed previously, which excludes the single payment from the
beneficiary's gross income, 3 which taxes the interest on proceeds
left on deposit with the insurance company,84 and which includes in
gross income the interest element in installment receipts except for
1,000 dollars annually paid to the surviving spouse.85
Under a more general topic of life insurance and fringe benefits,
other types of insurance such as individual term, individual per-
manent, group permanent, and split-dollar insurance would be dis-
cussed.86 However, none of these offer the numerous advantages of
group term life insurance and consequently are left for the text of a
more comprehensive and detailed analysis, as are programs of de-
ferred compensation 7 and the numerous uses of life insurance
policies as funding media.
III. CoRPoRonoNs' INSURABLE INTEREST IN EMPLOYEES' LIvEs
A. Definition, Reasons, and Development of Insurable
Interest in Life
Up to this point, the discussion has surveyed briefly the practical
uses of life insurance by corporations with emphasis upon the income
tax considerations. This discussion rests on the premise that the
family, which other taxpayers must pay for with after-tax dollars. I recommend
that the current annual value to the employee of employer-financed group term life
insurance protection be included in income, with an exception for the first $5,000 of
coverage to correspond to the present exclusion for uninsured death benefits."
83. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101(a)(1).
84. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101(c).
85. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101(d)(1) (B).
86. Life Insurance-Corporate Business Use, 34 BNA Tax Management 27-39 (1963),
presents an excellent detailed analysis and discussion of life insurance as a fringe
benefit.
87. "The specific tax advantages generally attributed to deferral plans are numerous.
First, the lower income of retirement years places that income in lower tax brackets.
Second, people of age sixty-five and older receive two personal exemptions (§ 151(c))
which allows them to receive more income tax free. Third, the retirement income
credit (§ 37) further reduces taxes. Fourth, when an employee elects to receive a
lump sum at retirement, this income receives capital gain treatment (§§ 402(a)(2),
403(a) (2), 1201, 1202). And fifth, postponing the tax payment permits the employee
to benefit from the investment of that portion which would otherwise be paid to the
federal government. Strecker, Taxation of Retirement Provision, 27 LAw & CONT=MP.
PROB. 67, 71 (1962).
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corporation legally could insure a particular employee. Examining this
premise is the next logical step in analyzing the problem area as
defined in the introduction. The practical importance of the con-
cluding theoretical discussion appears obvious from the Commissioner's
argument that the statutory phrase "insurance contract" means a valid
insurance contract, i.e., that the contract must satisfy all requirements
of insurance law including the existence of an insurable interest. Thus,
the corporation is not allowed to exclude the proceeds from gross
income unless the Commissioner's argument is met or discredited.
Defining insurable interest is not an easy matter. Using circuitous
reasoning, one could define an insurable interest as that prerequisite
relationship between a person and an event which is essential for
the existence of a life insurance contract. Needless to say, such a
definition is little help in trying to understand that relationship called
"insurable interest." Some authors honestly state that a precise
definition of insurable interest is impossible to formulate because of
the universal aspect of the concept in insurance law.88 After the
concept had evolved, one critic reached this conclusion, but attributed
the difficulty to another reason-that the concept per se rests on an
inadequate legal basis.89 Indeed, several of the leading treatises in the
field of insurance law offer no definition of the phrase,90 and even
distinguished jurists have had little success in their attempts to
define insurable interest.91 Professor Patterson has offered the most
understandable definition of insurable interest, as "a relationship be-
tween the insured and the event insured against such that the
occurrence of the event will cause substantial loss or harm of some
kind to the insured."9 2 Also, some states define insurable interest in
their statutes.93 While a perfectionist might contend that any at-
88. "Insurable interest in connection with life insurance cannot be precisely de-
fined, as in the effort to avoid wagering policies, no clear rule has been established
by the courts." 3 CoUcH, INSURANCE § 24:119 (2d ed. 1960).
89. "The doctrine of insurable interest resting on so unsubstantial a foundation,
it has not unnaturally resulted that great difficulty has been experienced in reaching a
consistent and comprehensive definition of what an insurable interest is, after all."
COOKE, THm LAW OF INSURANCE § 59 (1891).
90. See, e.g., 2 APPLEmAN, INSURANCE LAW AND Pn~crcE §§ 761-65 (1941); 3
CoucH, INSURANCE § 24:119 (2d ed. 1960), quoted note 88 supra.
91. E.g., "It is not easy to define with precision what will in all cases constitute
an insurable interest, so as to take the contract out of the class of wagering policies.
It may be stated generally, however, to be such an interest, arising from the
relations of the party obtaining the insurance . .. as will justify a reasonable ex-
pectation of advantage or benefit from the continuance of his life. It is not necessary
that the expectation of advantage or benefit should always be capable of pecuniary
estimation." Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775 (1881).
92. .ATrEaSON, EssENA.Ls OF INSURANCE LAw § 34 (2d ed. 1957).
93. E.g., "The term 'insurable interest' is defined as meaning... in the case of other
persons [not related by blood or law], a lawful economic interest in having the
life of the insured continue as distinguished from an interest which would arise only
by death of the insured." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 512 (1962).
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tempted definition of insurable interest is either too general and too
vague to be practically useful or too precise and too specific to be
universally applicable, certainly Professor Patterson has stated a
workable definition, especially for the limited scope of this note.
Two general public policies support the requirement of insurable
interest in lifeY4 The first is the policy that wagering is harmful to
the individual and to society,95 because it rewards unproductive
labor and fosters idleness in contravention of the protestant ethic,96
an almost universally accepted code in England when the requirement
was developed in the common law. The policy against murder is the
second.97 To allow a person to insure the life of another with whom
he had no relationship would reward and possibly motivate the
murder of the cestui que vie.98 The major deterrent against intentional
homicide, of course, is the criminal code's punishment for the com-
mission of such heinous crimes rather than this insurance law concept.
Often authorities list a third policy reason, namely, to retain the
indemnity principle in insurance.91 Being primarily relevant to prop-
erty insurance, however, this policy has little application to life
insurance'00 other than credit insurance, 101 for the amount of recovery
94. See PATrERSON & YOUNG, CASES & MATERIALS ON INSURANCE 242 (4th ed. 1961).
See generally PATTERSON, EssmirmLLs OF INSURANCE LAW § 34 (2d ed. 1957).
95. See, e.g., Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775 (1881). "Such a policy [i.e., one in
which there was no insurable interest] would constitute what is termed a wager
policy, or a mere speculative contract upon the life of the assured, with a direct
interest in its early termination." Id. at 778. "Many courts have stated broadly that
insurance contracts in which the beneficiary lacked insurable interest were against
public policy and void, usually upon the ground that they are mere wagering or
gambling contracts." 2 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw AND PRACTICE § 761 (1941) (Em-
phasis added.)
96. Ponder the current strength of this public policy in the current context of
American life with its easy accessibility to legal casinos (e.g., Las Vegas), to legal
pari-mutual betting at race tracks (e.g., Churchill Downs), and to the common
knowledge that the odds were 7 to 1 against Clay in his championship bout against
Liston.
97. PATErsoN, Essm'NIALs OF INSURANc E LA w § 34 (2d ed. 1957).
98. As most readers already know, the cestui que vie, sometimes abbreviated
"CQV," is the person whose death is a condition of the insurer's promise to pay the
face amount of the policy. This term is used to avoid the ambiguity of using "in-
sured" to designate both the person making the contract with the insurer and the
person whose death is a condition of payment.
99. See note 97 supra.
100. "No American case has been found in which the amount of recovery on the
policy was limited either by the value of the interest of the insured or beneficiary in
the life of the insured, or by the circumstance that the same life was insured under
other policies. It is commonly said that the life insurance contract is not a 'contract
of indemnity."' PATTERSON & YOUNG, CASES & MATERIAlS ON INSURANCE 233 (4th
ed. 1961). But cf., "Life insurance in such a case [key man insurance] is like that
of fire and marine insurance, a contract of indemnity." United States v. Supplee-
Biddle Co., 265 U.S. 189, 195 (1924).
101. Generally, courts recognize that a creditor possesses an insurable interest in
his debtor's life. However, the amount of insurance which a creditor legally may
obtain and the amount of the proceeds which he may retain when sued by the
is determined in advance contractually by the face amount of the
policy, not by measuring the pecuniary value of the cestui que vie's
life after its loss occurs. Arguably, the concept of insurance as a
contract of indemnity perhaps was contraposed against the notion of
a wagering contract and, as such, manifests that basic policy in a
positive context.102 Yet, a corporation insuring itself against the death
of a key man basically is entering a contract to indemnify it against
the resulting loss.
To understand the development of insurable interest concept in
Anglo-American jurisprudence, one should begin historically with the
origin of insurance. The practice of insuring the risks inherent in
maritime trade developed in the Italian city-states. Italian merchant
seamen introduced this practice to the British seamen and traders,
which practice became common in Britain by the sixteenth century.
The hazard and uncertainty of maritime ventures, the most risky
commercial activity of the period, naturally inferred that any promise
to pay a fixed sum if a vessel did not arrive safely in port was a
gamble, a wager, a game. Insurance covering marine risks expanded
to cover other losses, including the loss of life. Being unable to as-
certain "the antiquity of this practice," the author of an early English
treatise cites the French book Le Guidon as mentioning life insurance
"as a contract perfectly well known at that time [1661] in other coun-
tries," but reporting "that it was a species of contract wholly forbidden
in France, as being repugnant to good morals, and as opening a door
to a variety of frauds and abuses." 10 3 However, in England common
law wagers were legal and enforceable in the courts, and the judicial
doctrine of stare decisis perpetuated this legality, even as to wagers
on human lives, despite the puritanical influence on public opinion
in that period. 0 4 Responding to public opinion and being cognizant
of the utter disregard for human feelings which some gamblers ex-
decreased debtor's personal representative have been questioned in the courts. Limiting
the amount of insurance to the amount of the debt would deprive the creditor's
protection against losing both the interest on the debt and the expense of the in-
surance (i.e., the premiums plus interest). The only principle apparent in the case
law states that a creditor's life insurance on his debtor is valid if the amount is not
too greatly disproportionate. For example, the creditor's insurance on the debtor's
life was held valid in Ulrich v. Reinoehl, 143 Pa. 238, 22 Ad. 862 (1891) (debt $110;
insurance $3,000), and in Cranes Adm'rs v. Kline, 115 Pa. St. 618, 9 Atl. 150 (1887)
(debt $743 including $470 for premiums which creditor paid on abandoned policies;
insurance $3,000). However, some courts construe the insurance as security for the
debt, thus limiting the creditor to the amount of the debt plus interest. E.g., Chapman
v. Scott, 234 S.C. 469, 109 S.E.2d 1 (1959).
102. Note, 49 GEo. L.J. 594, 597 (1961).
103. PARK, MAMIU INSURANCE 430 (3d ed. 1792).
104. Consider, as examples, the two following cases: In the Earl of March v. Pigot,
5 Burn. 2802, 98 Eng. Rep. 471 (1771), the parties exchanged reciprocal notes
promising to pay the other a specific number of guineas (500 and 1600 in the two
notes respectively) if the maker's father predeceased the payee's father. Although the
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hibited, Parliament passed statutes which required an insured to have
an insurable interest in property'05 and in life'06 as a condition pre-
cedent to the existence of a valid contract, Parliament's intent being
to void contracts made "by way of gaming or wagering."1 7 English
judges applied these statutes liberally and invalidated any insurance
contract which suggested that it was a wager.108
When American judges began developing their common law,109
they either relied on these later English cases or adopted the position
enunciated in the English statutes as embodying their state's general
public policy."0 For example, a Massachusetts court, delivering one
of the earliest American opinions on insurable interest, held that an
insurable interest in life was a prequisite to recovery on the insurance
policy, because otherwise "it would be a mere-wager policy," whose
.enforcement would be "contrary to the general policy of our laws.""'
reporters footnote expressly stated, "such a wager would now be void by 14 Geo. 3,
c. 48," neither the parties nor the court, which included Lord Mansfield, questioned
the validity of the wagering contract. Mr. Justice Aston's statement that "it was
originally intended to be a bet between two young heirs apparent; and the material
point to be settled was to fix the difference of the chances of survivorship of their
fathers" evidences the fact that the court recognized the contract to be a wagering
contract.
In the Earl of Chesterfield v. Jansen, 1 Atk. 301, 26 Eng. Rep. 191 (1750), S
gave J a "bond" promising to pay J £ 10,000 if S survived Al in consideration for
£ 5,000. Al died. In payment of this bond, S gave J a time note containing certain
penalty provisions for default. Having paid £ 2,000 of the £ 10,000 debt, S died.
S's executors filed a bill to relieve the estate of the debt and to cancel the note,
alleging that it was "an unconscionsable bargain." Despite the wagering nature of the
contract, the court enforced the debt against the estate although it did declare the
penalty provisions to be void.
105. Marine Ins. Act, 1746, 19 Geo. 2, c. 37 (repealed).
106. Life Assur. Act, 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, which states: "An act for regulating
insurance upon lives, and for prohibiting all such insurances, except in cases where the
persons insurance shall have an interest in the life or death of the person insured ...
[N]o insurance shall be made by any person or persons, bodies politick or corporate,
on the life or lives of any person or persons . . . wherein the person or persons for
whose use, benefit ... [etc., the policies were] made, shall have no interest, or by
way of gaming or wagering; and that every assurance made, contrary to the true
intent and meaning hereof, shall be null and void, to all intents and purposes what-
soever.
107. Life Assur. Act, 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c. 48.
108. See, e.g., Halford v. Kymer, 10 B. & C. 724, 109 Eng. Rep. 619 (1830).
109. See generally Kimball, The Role of the Court in the Development of Insurance
Law, 1957 Wis. L. R-v. 520.
110. See, e.g., 3 CoucH, INSURANCE § 24:1 (2d ed. 1960), which states in part:
"In this country, however, the courts were quick to recognize the necessity of an
insurable interest, and it is now almost universally held, either by force of statutory
regulations or upon general principles of public policy or similar grounds, that an
insurable interest is necessary to the validity of a policy. See generally Cammack
v. Lewis, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 643 (1872).
111. Lord v. Dall, 12 Mass. 115 (1815) (sister, dependent on her brother for
support and education, has an insurable interest in his life). Specifically, the court's
opinion stated: "It is said, that, being a contract of assurance, the law on the subject
of marine insurance is applicable to it; and, therefore, unless the assured had an
1282 [VOL° 17
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Incidentally, this development coincided with the prevalent protestant
ethic and American public opinion which were extremely hostile to
gambling and wagers. 12 Thus, regardless of the legal ground or
reasoning, the requirement of an insurable interest as a prerequisite
to a valid insurance contract became firmly entrenched in the Ameri-
can common law. In fact, so well established was the doctrine by
1891 that a vehement, outspoken critic of insurable interest who con-
sidered it "a false, artificial and confusing restriction" on the law of
contracts realized that his voice cried in the wilderness." 3 Currently,
several states have codified this requirement of insurable interest., 4
The one exception to this entire discussion is New Jersey, whose
courts have held that New Jersey law does not require an insurable
interest in life, absent a statute to the contrary."5
interest in the subject-matter insured, he is not entitled to his action. This position
we agree to; for, otherwise, it would be a mere wager-policy, which we think would
be contrary to the general policy of our laws, and therefore void." Id. at 117 (Emphasis
added.)
112. However, it is interesting to note that in this period lotteries for worthy causes
were sanctioned. See generally WIL.mAMS, Lorrzsus, LAws AND MOcAIS (1958).
For example, in 1748 leading Philadelphians, including Benjamin Franklin, sponsored
a lottery to raise k 3,000 to purchase cannons for the city's defense. In 1746 the
first of several lotteries for King's College, now Columbia University, was held. Id.
at 29. Ecclesiastical goals, such as money to build churches, were the objects of
numerous lotteries. Ibid. And one of the most historically interesting lotteries was
authorized by the Virginia legislature in 1826 to aid the financial problems of Thomas
Jefferson. Id. at 40.
113. CooxE, THE LAw OF INSURANCE § 58 (1891). Because the book is an
antique and perhaps unavailable to the reader, and because of the author's colorful
antagonism for the insurable interest requirement, a part of his opinion is quoted.
"If, however, the contract of insurance is for the benefit of another than the insured,
there seems on principle no reason why it should not be governed by the rules ap-
plicable to contracts generally, as to who may obtain the benefit thereof. In such
cases there is ordinarily no restriction as to the class of persons that may obtain such
benefit. But in the case of contracts of insurance, there has become established a
false, artificial and confusing restriction as to the class of persons that may obtain the
benefit of such a contract. That is to say, the doctrine is, that the beneficiary must
have an insurable interest in the life of the insured. This doctrine is based on the
supposition that it is contrary to public policy, that one person should have an
expectation of a benefit conditioned on the happening of the death of another; that
the temptation to destroy the life of such other, in order to obtain such benefit, must
be balanced, or counteracted, as it were, by the existence of an insurable interest in
his life. But the theory that it is contrary to public policy, that one person should
have an expectation of a benefit conditioned on the happening of the death of another,
finds little, if any support from the rules applied to analogous cases; for it is just this
expectation that exists in the case of a devise or legacy, or in case of dower and
other life tenancies; yet it never seems to have been seriously suggested that on that
ground devises, legacies or life tenancies are invalid, as contrary to public policy."
CooKE, THE LAw OF INSURANCE § 58 (1891).
114. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CoDE ANN. § 286. "[An interest in the life or health of
a person insured must exist when the insurance takes effect, but need not exist there-
after or when the loss occurs."
115. Howard v. Commonwealth Benefit Ass'n, 98 N.J.L. 267, 118 Atl. 449 (1922).
The New Jersey law on this subject is discussed in Fulda, Insurable Interest in Life,
New Jersey View, 1 Ru=Eias L. REv. 29 (1947).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
B. Current Status of the Law
A corporation possesses an insurable interest in the lives of its key
men. This basic principle of insurance law has become so imbedded
in the American common law, as discussed above, that only a statute
could remove it. The problem with which the courts wrestle is not
whether the principle is valid and applicable, but whether the
cestui que vie was a key man. Thus, once the court decides that a
specific individual was or was not a key man, the result flows auto-
matically from the axiomatic application of the principle-a corpora-
tion has an insurable interest in the lives of its key men; a corporation
has no insurable interest in the lives of ordinary employees." 6 Termi-
nating the employment with the corporation does not invalidate a
life insurance policy, provided that the insurable interest existed at
the inception of the policy. 
17
To define a key man, courts and other authorities have enunciated
several descriptive phrases. For example, a key man is one on whose
services the corporation depends for its prosperity," 8 one "whose death
would be the cause of substantial loss" to the corporation," 9 one
whose "relation to and knowledge of the financial and manufacturing
interest of the plaintiff [corporation] was such that his death could
not fail to result in serious and substantial loss to its creditors and
all others interested in its prosperity,"u2 or one from whose death
"in the ordinary course of events, financial loss or disadvantage will
naturally and probably result." These phrases should sound familiar,
116. See Annot., 75 A.L.R. 1362.
117. Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911). Some states have a statute to this
effect. E.g., CAL.. INs. CoD ANN. § 286, quoted in part, note 114 supra.
118. "A corporation is often quite dependent upon the services of particular officers
for its prosperity. Under such. circumstances a corporation has an insurable interest
in the life of such an officer .. " Wurzburg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 140 Tenn.
59, 63, 203 S.W. 332, 333 (1918).
119. United Security Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Brown, 270 Pa. 270, 272, 113 At.
446, 447 (1921) (no insurable interest in the life of a storage house manager).
In full, the quotation reads: "To sustain a contract of this character [i.e., life in-
surance], it must further appear that there is a real concern in the life of the
party named [i.e., cestui que vie], whose death would be the cause of substantial
loss to those who are ordinarily named as beneficiaries. This does not follow the
cessation of ordinary service, but arises where the success of the business is dependent
on the continued life of the employee."
120. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Board, Armstrong, & Co., 115 Va. 836, 80 S.,E. 565
(1914) (insurable interest in the life of the president and general manager of the
corporation). The court states: "His [the deceased's] relation to and knowledge of
the financial and manufacturing interest of the plaintiff [the corporate employer] was
such that his death could not fail to result in serious and substantial loss to its creditors
and all others interested in its prosperity." Id. at 838, 80 S.E. at 566.
121. United Security Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Perugini Union Mut. Relief Ass'n,
273 Pa. 554, 117 AUt. 413 (1921), where the court said: "'It is enough that in the
ordinary course of events, financial loss or disadvantage will naturally and probably
result from the death of the one whose life is insured to the person obtaining the
policy."' Id. at 557, 117 AUt. at 414.
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for even a cursory analysis of them indicates that these phrases
employ the same words which are used to define or to describe
insurable interest. Thus, the determination of who is a key man is
essentially a determination of the employees in whom the corporation
has an insurable interest. Stating that Mr. X is a key man is merely
stating the conclusion that the corporation possesses an insurable
interest in the life of Mr. X. In short, the "key man" concept, which
has no independent identity from the "insurable interest" concept,
provides no guidance in determining the scope of the latter concept.
The test which courts use to determine whether the corporation
has an insurable interest in the life of an employee is whether the
relationship between the corporation and the employee is such that
his death will cause substantial loss or harm to the corporation.
22
This test, which in essence relies both on the definition of insurable
interest and on the definition of a key man, for they are the same,
is a question of fact.'m Of course, since the relation between the
employee and the corporation is the crucial determinative fact, every
case requires that the court examine the facts involved in order to
resolve the issue. 2 4 Consequently, cases may be cited as holding
that a corporation has an insurable interest in the life of its president
and director,m25 its president,26 vice president, 1 7 secretary, 28 treas-
urer, 29 general manager,130 department manager,'3 ' and branch man-
ager. 32 Yet, these titles of authority and responsibility do not conclu-
sively determine the existence of an insurable interest. There is no
122. "The insurable interest of a corporation under such circumstances is a question
of fact, and the test is whether a pecuniary loss may be reasonably expected to
result to the corporation from the death of the insured. This is a correct statement
of the law as held in numerous cases." Wagner v. Nat'l Engraving Co., 307 IIl. App.
509, 512, 30 N.E.2d 750, 751 (1940).
123. Ibid.
124. See, e.g., Atlantic Oil Co. v. Patterson, 63-1 CCH U.S. TAX CASES ff 9445
(N.D. Ala. 1963) (judgment entered on jury's verdict as to who actually took out the
insurance policy).
125. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Forester, 223 Ala. 218, 135 So. 167 (1931); West
End Savings Bank v. Goodwin, 223 Ala. 185, 135 So. 161 (1931).
126. E.g., United States v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 265 U.S. 189 (1924);
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Board, Armstrong & Co., 115 Va. 836, 80 S.E. 565 (1914).
127. E.g., Murray v. G. F. Higgins Co., 300 Pa. 341, 150 Ad. 629 (1930) (Cestui
que vie was vice president, director, and superintendent, signed checks and contracts,
etc.)
128. E.g., Reilly v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 201 Iowa 555, 207 N.W. 583 (1926).
129. E.g., First Columbus Natl Bank v. D. S. Pate Lumber Co., 163 Miss. 691, 141
So. 767 (1932); Baker v. Keet-Rountree Dry Goods Co., 318 Mo. 969, 2 S.W.2d 733
(1928).
130. E.g., Sandlin's Admr'x v. Allen, 262 Ky. 355, 90 S.W.2d 350 (1936); Wurz-
burg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 140 Tenn. 59, 203 S.W. 332 (1918).
131. E.g., Am. Trust Co. v. Life Ins. Co., 173 N.C. 558, 92 S.E. 706 (1917).
132. E.g., Alexander v. Griffith Brokerage Co., 228 Mo. App. 773, 73 S.W.2d 418
(1934).
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insurable interest in these officers unless the facts of the specific case
demonstrate that the individual conducted the affairs of the corporation
as a person usually holding the title would effectuate his responsibil-
ity.1 3 The activities of an individual, not the individual's title, create
the relationship with the corporation which gives the corporation an
insurable interest.
Some authorities indicate that to prove the existence of an insurable
interest one must demonstrate a twofold pecuniary interest: (1) that
the employee's experience, knowledge, and skill are necessary for the
success of the corporation, and (2) that the employee's death would
cause the corporation a substantial loss. 134 In essence, however, these
are merely different aspects of the same interest, for the absence of
anything necessary for success of a corporation would cause it a
substantial loss.
A split of authority exists on the question of who has judicial stand-
ing to raise the defense of lack of insurable interest. The English
rule states that only the insurer can raise the question,13 a rule which
is adopted in a small number of American states. 3 6 Basically, this
rule implies that an insurance contract without an insurable interest is
voidable, not void. 3 7 Thus, unless the insurance company elects to
avoid the contract rather than pay the proceeds, a contract exists
analogous to a contract with a minor. However, the majority of
American courts allow others besides the insurer to raise the defense
and thus imply that the contract is void, not merely voidable.1' This
difference is based on an historical accident of development, not on
judicial decisions which considered the difference. A statute generated
the English rule requiring insurable interest and where it was in-
applicable the English common law sanctioning wagers applied;
judicial opinions generated the American rule based on a general
policy against wagering and a special abhorence of wagering with
133. See, e.g., United Security Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 270 Pa. 270, 113 Ad. 446
(1921) (mere designation of an employee as "manager" was not sufficient to demon-
strate an insurable interest, because there was no proof that the success of the business
depended on his life).
134. Note, 49 GEo. L.J. 594, 606 (1961), and cases cited therein.
135. Worthington v. Curtis, L.R. 1 Ch. 419 (1875).
136. Clements v. Terrell, 167 Ga. 237, 145 S.E. 78 (1928); Poland v. Fisher's Estate,
329 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. 1959). But see Annot., 175 A.L.R. 1276 (1948).
137. This implication is based on the following words: "[T]here are two reasons for
which the appeal must fail. First, because the statute is a defence for the insurance
company only, if they choose to avail themselves of it. If they do not, the question
who is entitled to the money must be determined as if the statute did not exist. [And
at common law insurance contracts without an insurable interest, being wagering con-
tracts, were legally enforceable obligations.] The contract is only made void as be-
tween the company and the insurer." Washington v. Curtis, L.R. 1 Ch. 419, 425
(1875).
138. Cf., CALIF. INS. CODE § 280: "If the insured has no insurable interest, the
contract is void."
lives. Early American litigants did not question the right to raise the
defense; consequently, cases were reported in which noninsurers used
the defense. 139 These cases form the precedent for allowing any party
to raise the question. Dictum by the Supreme Court implies that
the Commissioner can raise the question of insurable interest where
the ultimate issue is taxation of the proceeds, 14 a point expressly made
in the cases noted in the introduction.
C. Analysis and Recommended Changes
An adequate analysis of the requirement that a corporation have
an insurable interest in its employees' lives before it can procure a
valid life insurance policy necessitates examining the nature of Ameri-
can corporations today to see how this requirement of insurable
interest supports the public policies upon which it is based.
Professor Berle has expounded the economic theory that the classi-
cal, free enterprise concept of small, independent entrepreneurs com-
peting among themselves to sell their wares and to attract invest-
ors' savings for expansion is inapplicable to America today.141 In-
stead, a relatively small number of giant economic complexes com-
pletely dominate their industrial field.142 Consider, for example, the
automotive industry with General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, the
electrical appliance industry with General Electric and Westinghouse,
the steel industry with U. S. Steel, and the tobacco industry with
R. J. Reynolds and American Tobacco. While one might question
Professor Berle's suggestions and conclusions, it is difficult to refute
his initial premise concerning the American economic scene. Never,
theless, this basic premise does not deny the existence of small closed
corporations.
With this background it becomes necessary to distinguish sharply
between two denotations of the words "key man." First, many cor-
porations colloquially call their top echelon of manging executives
"key men," a fact which has never been determinative of legal issue.
Second, the legal denotation of "key man," as discussed above, states
the conclusion that the corporation possesses an insurable interest in
his life and that his life is essential to the prosperity of the company.
True, these two aspects of "key man" arise from the same economic
facts. However, the first states a sociological conclusion that an
individual is successful and, to use the colloquial, "has it made"; the
second states a legal conclusion in the area of insurance law. The
139. E.g., Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911); Bromley's Adm'r v. Worthington
Life Ins. Co., 122 Ky. 402, 92 S.W. 17 (1906).
140. United States v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 265 U.S. 189 (1924).
141. BEmLF TAE 20ra CENrtray C.Amis REVOLUTION (1954).




discussion in this note, which recognizes the existence of the first
denotation, is concerned only with the second.
In this context, examine the relationship of specific employees to
their corporate employer and the loss accruing to the corporation
upon their death. For example, although a corporation loses a plant
manager's technical knowledge and skill when he dies, usually several
young, intelligent assistant plant managers are available for promotion
to eliminate the loss. In this case has the giant corporation actually
suffered any greater economic loss than when an assembly line fore-
man, who knows thoroughly both the intricate process and his sub-
ordinates' capabilities, dies? The education, experience, and ability
of the corporation's president will be gone upon his death, but is the
cost of finding and acquiring a new replacement any bigger than
the cost of hiring and training employees to program the corpora-
tion's computers or to design improved products? The point is
simple. Both the giant size of corporations today and the increased
amount of training and skill required to gain employment cause the
distinction between an essential employee (i.e., a key man) and a
nonessential employee (i.e., an ordinary employee) to diminish. The
demand for more highly skilled labor increases the expense of training
these ordinary employees; the gigantic size of these corporations infers
that one individual is less significant economically to the corporation.
If this be an economic reality, why maintain and reconstruct the
legal distinction? The author suggests that there is no valid reason for
so doing, despite the existence of the sociological distinction. The
legal distinction between key men and ordinary employees should be
abolished; a corporation should have an insurable interest in all
employees' lives. Parenthetically, the contention that a corporation
should have an insurable interest in all of its employees is neither
radical nor original, for North Carolina has a statute giving, un-
qualifiedly, an employer, including corporations, an insurable interest
in the life of every employee. 43 It is doubtful that this has increased
either wagering via life insurance policies or murders in that state, a
point which refers to two of the public policies supporting insurable
interest.
The primary advantage of abolishing this meaningless distinction
between key men and other employees is the more logical results
obtainable under current business conditions. A second advantage
143. N.C. GFN. STAT. § 58-204.1 (1963). "Insurable interest in life and physical
ability of employee or agent. An employer, whether a partnership, joint venture, busi-
ness trust, mutual association, corporation, any other form of business organization, or
one or more individuals, or any religious, educational, charitable corporation, institution
or body has an insurable interest and right to insure the physical ability of the life
or both the physical ability and the life, of an employee for the benefit of such em-
ployer." (Emphasis added.) See generally Note 29, N.C.L. REv. 351, 401 (1951).
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is the simplicity of the proposed rule's application. Whereby many
difficult problems, which otherwise would arise, are avoided. For
example, is a Phi Beta Kappa member, who later was graduated from
the Harvard Business School, who completed the corporation's
managerial training program, who is climbing the executive ladder
of authority, but who has been an employee of the corporation only
four years, a key man? Is a super-salesman, who consistently wins his
company's top salesman award but who has no authority or responsi-
bility besides selling, a key man? These difficult problems and others
would be avoided by adopting the contention presented. A third
advantage relates to those two policies which generally are cited to
support the requirement of insurable interest. As mentioned with
the North Carolina statute, it is doubtful that the new rule would
have the practical effect of encouraging either wagering or homicide.
But, a critic might retort that all of these arguments are premised
on the large corporation and that these objections to the current
rule of law are inapplicable to the small closed corporation. Truly
in small corporations one can more easily distinguish between key
men and ordinary employees (applying the usual social connotations
to those words). However, as the size of the business decreases,
every employee becomes relatively more important and necessary
for the corporation's economic prosperity. For example, consider
the route man of a small diaper service who knows all the company's
customers personally, who thus fosters much good will, and who also
can be trusted to collect amounts due on account where the company
has inadequate accounting procedures to detect petty theft. Or, con-
sider a supply room clerk who knows the exact location and approxi-
mate quantity of the supplies where the corporation has no formal
organization of the supply room and no accounting method of in-
ventory of supplies. These concrete examples indicate both the
valuable service which so-called ordinary employees render to a
small corporation and the relative economic dependence of the cor-
poration on their continued service. Thus, empirically, the arguments
to abolish the distinction are equally valid to small corporations.
E. RALPH CoTm, IV
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